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Abstract
We develop a Downsian model of electoral competition in which candidates with both policy and o ce-
motivations use a mixture of platforms and campaign spending to gain the median voter’s support. The
unique equilibrium involves randomizing over both platforms and spending, and exhibits the following
properties – (i) ex-ante uncertainty in platforms, spending, and the election winner, (ii) platform
divergence, (iii) ine ciency in spending and outcomes, (iv) polarization, and (v) voter extremism. We
also show that platform polarization and campaign spending move in tandem, since spending is used
by candidates to gain support for extreme platforms. Factors that contribute to both phenomena
include the candidates’ desire for extreme platforms, and their ability to translate campaign spending
into support for them. The latter insight generates new hypotheses about the potential causes of both
rising polarization and spending.
Two of the most striking features of American elections are the growing polarization of candidates
(Hall (2018)) and the ever-increasing amounts of campaign spending (Meirowitz (2008)), leading sev-
eral scholars to speculate that these phenomena are linked (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006)).
We develop a model that organizes a collection of empirical regularities, o↵ers a plausible rationale
for this link, and generates new hypotheses about the potential causes of both phenomena.
We build on the classic Downsian model of electoral competition, in which two candidates simulta-
neously commit to policy platforms. In equilibrium the candidates converge to the median voter’s ideal
policy, even if they are partially or wholly ideologically motivated. We add the ability to make costly
campaign expenditures; in our model each candidate simultaneously chooses how much to spend along-
side her choice of platform. Spending improves the voters’ evaluation of her non-ideological attributes
or valence (e.g. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009); Groseclose (2001); Meirowitz (2008); Serra
(2010); Wiseman (2006)), as in previous works studying campaign spending.
The main strategic force in our model is that ideologically-motivated candidates (Calvert (1985))
exploit spending to gain support for more extreme platforms. We show that this produces five striking
equilibrium e↵ects. The first is electoral uncertainty – both the platforms of candidates, and the
behavior of voters, are ex-ante unpredictable. The second is platform divergence – both candidates
position strictly away from the median. The third is ine ciency – candidates always waste money
trying to win, and there is uncertainty over the final policy outcome that harms voters and candidates.
The fourth is polarization – candidates are most likely to take extreme positions far from the median,
and outcomes are most likely to be far as well. The fifth is voter extremism – the median paradoxically
selects the candidate with the most extreme platform due to this candidate’s excessively high spending.
We next examine how the candidates’ platform polarization and spending are a↵ected by the
candidates’ motivations, the voters’ motivations, and the cost of raising funds and influencing voters
with them. Across all comparative statics we find that polarization and spending move together,
thereby o↵ering a plausible explanation for the connection between them; polarization reflects the
candidates’ willingness to exploit spending to gain support for more ideologically extreme platforms.
Two factors simultaneously contribute to both phenomena. The first is the candidates desire to
influence policy outcomes, determined by both their ideological extremism and ideological intensity.
We thus reproduce an existing hypothesis about the cause of rising polarization – that candidates are
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taking more ideologically-extreme platforms because they have intrinsically more extreme preferences
(Fiorina (1999)). (Note that more extreme preferences do not generate more extreme platforms in the
classic Downsian model). The second is the candidates’ ability to translate spending into support for
extreme platforms. This ability is in turn the product of three factors. The first is the marginal cost
of a dollar of campaign spending, which is naturally interpreted as the marginal cost of fundraising.
This is influenced by the candidates’ (dis)taste for fundraising, their skill (or lack thereof) at doing so,
and their ability to target potential donors. The second is the marginal impact of a dollar of spending
on voters; this is influenced by the dollar cost of traditional campaign activities like advertising and
canvassing, their e↵ectiveness in conjunction with new tools like microtargetting, and the availability
of new persuasive strategies like social media. The third is the strength of the votes’ ideological
commitments, which influences how much spending is needed to “compensate” them for ideologically
extreme platforms. If spending becomes cheaper or more e↵ective through any of these channels (or
a combination), our model predicts that an increase in both polarization and spending will result.
We last examine welfare. Results about voter welfare hinge crucially on whether the valence
generated by campaign spending actually improves welfare – because it reflects “character valence”
attributes like competence and expertise (Stone and Simas (2010)) – or simply proxies for how spending
biases voters. Assuming the latter, spending competition harms voters, and factors that increase
polarization reduce welfare; this is in line with the conventional wisdom about polarization. Assuming
the former, spending competition actually helps voters, and factors that increase polarization increase
voter welfare, due to the higher candidate valence that also results. A surprising implication is that
constraints on fundraising and spending would actually harm voters despite causing platforms to
moderate. The candidates, in contrast, are unambiguously harmed by campaign spending, and become
worse o↵ as their desire or ability to influence policy outcomes goes up. For them, “dialing for dollars”
is a wasteful race to the bottom that both would prefer to avoid, but neither can commit to.
Related Literature Our model joins a literature studying the choice of platforms and spending. Our
most notable di↵erence is the sequence – candidates choose platforms and spending simultaneously,
rather than platforms and then spending (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009); Zakharov (2009)),
spending and then platforms (Serra (2010)), or choosing in a predetermined order (Wiseman (2006)).1
1For brevity do not detail other substantial related literatures that assume either platforms or valence are exogenous,
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In the real world candidates do not literally choose all strategies simultaneously; however, since they
can both adjust platforms and spending throughout a campaign (Iaryczower, Lopez and Meirowitz
(2017)), simultaneity is an arguably more agnostic assumption than any particular fixed sequence. A
second key di↵erence is that our candidates have a mixture of policy and o ce motivations; this allows
us to identify important di↵erences between them.
Several of our results appear in these other works, but sometimes for di↵erent reasons. In Zakharov
(2009) and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009) o ce-motivated candidates uncertain about the
median’s preferences diverge to dampen the e↵ect of spending and intensity of competition; but this
e↵ect is sensitive to the form of candidate uncertainty. Incentives in our model are more similar to
Wiseman (2006) and Serra (2010); the latter also finds a positive association between polarization
and spending, and a negative one between both and the cost of valence. Key features of that model’s
equilibrium, however, do not fit the data well. Voters and candidates know ex-ante where candidates
will position and who win, while real elections exhibit substantial uncertainty. The losing candidate
always converges to the median, while real-world elections exhibit substantial divergence by both
parties (Bafumi and Herron (2010)). And polarization is a function of the asymmetry in candidate
extremism – as it shrinks, both polarization and the comparative statics e↵ects vanish.
While our paper clearly complements rather than substitutes for existing work, one clear advantage
is its tractability, which makes it well suited for empirical testing. Despite the apparent di culty of
working with mixed strategies, it has a unique, continuous, easily expressed equilibrium, with clear
comparative statics in all parameters and outcomes, across the full parameter space. Previous works
exhibit complex and very discontinuous strategies as well as equilibrium multiplicity (Ashworth and
Bueno de Mesquita (2009)), only explore part of the parameter space (Serra (2010)), do not solve for
Nash equilibria (Zakharov (2009)), or require numerical derivations (Wiseman (2006)); several conduct
comparative statics analysis via examples (Wiseman (2006), Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009)).
The Model
Two candidates i 2 { 1, 1} simultaneously choose ideological platforms  i 2 R and costly spending
levels qi 2 [0,1) = R+. A median voter (V ) then votes for her preferred candidate and the game
or that endogenize both but include other distinctive features – see Zakharov (2009) for a review.
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ends. Platforms are commitments to spatial policies that will be implemented in o ce. Spending is a
reduced-form representation for costly actions that make voting for a given candidate more appealing to
the voters, holding platforms fixed. The median’s ideal is normalized to 0, and her utility for selecting
candidate i is µqi    v 2i . She thus places a weight  v on ideological outcomes, and a candidate
spending qi generates a valence return of µqi. For now we are agnostic about the interpretation of
valence. Interpreted literally, valence makes the voters better o↵. However, valence could instead
proxy for how spending biases voters without increasing welfare (e.g. uninformative campaigning).2
µ reflects the sensitivity of the voter’s valence perception to a dollar of campaign spending. Note that
the voters’ preferences are known to the candidates, in contrast to Calvert (1985).
Candidates have both policy and o ce motivations. Letting w denote the election winner (and  w
the winning platform), candidate i’s final utility from the election outcome is 1i=w✓    c (xi    w)2 .
xi is candidate i’s ideal ideology. As in the canonical model by Calvert (1985), candidates have policy
goals, but must first achieve the “proximate” goal of election to achieve those goals. ✓ represents o ce-
holding benefits such as ego rents or salary.  c is the candidates’ weight on ideology. Candidates prefer
to avoid spending, which costs aqi and enters additively into their utility. We consider candidates who
are equidistant from the median (|xi| = |x i| = x) on opposite sides, so candidate i’s ideal is xi = ix.
Equilibrium
The model is a variant of an all-pay contest (Siegel (2009)) and related to the policy development model
of Hirsch and Shotts (2015).3 A candidate’s strategy is a two-dimensional “bid” ( i, qi) consisting of
a platform and spending level in a “contest” to win the median’s support. The median’s utility
si = µqi    v 2i for candidate i is the “score” of candidate i’s “bid,” meaning it is the quantity
determining who wins. A candidate can increase her score in two ways. First, she can increase
spending – this is costly up front, but has no e↵ect on the benefit from winning. Second, she can
position closer to the median – this is “free” up front, but makes winning less valuable.
There is a unique equilibrium that is in symmetric mixed strategies; candidates randomize over
2Spending may also represent the sum of positive campaigning to improve a candidates’ own image and negative
campaigning to worsen her opponent’s image – see Appendix D for details.
3Di↵erences in the current model are: (i) the median voter has no “outside option” to the two candidates, (ii)
candidates care about winning and not just policy, (iii) “valence” is only valued by the median and not also the candidates,
(iv) the median’s weight on valence may vary, and (iv) the ideological intensity of both candidates and voters may vary.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Strategies and Outcomes
both platforms and spending. Candidates must randomize for similar reasons as a classic all-pay
contest; a candidate who is spending something but losing for sure has an incentive to instead spend
nothing, a candidate who is winning by a strictly positive margin has a strict incentive to spend less,
and candidates who are tied both have an incentive to spend a little bit more and win.4
Proposition 1. The probability that a candidate positions closer to the median than distance y is
FY (y) = min
n⇣
a v
µ c
⌘⇣
x
x y
⌘
, 1
o
. When positioning at distance y, candidate i selects platform  i (y) =
iy and spends qY (y) =
1
µ
 
sY (y) +  vy2
 
, where sY (y) =
R y
0  v
x
(x yˆ)2
⇣
✓
 c
+ 4xyˆ
⌘
dyˆ.
Strategies are depicted in Figure 1. The left panel shows the platforms (on the x-axis) and spending
(on the y-axis) that the left (purple) and right (blue) candidate mix over. The median’s indi↵erence
curves, i.e., the pairs of platforms and spending that she is equally willing to vote for, are in gray. The
right panel shows the density (PDF) over the left (purple) and right (blue) candidates’ platforms, as
well as the density (in gray) of the final policy outcome (i.e., the platform of the winning candidate).5
Properties of Equilibrium
Uncertainty Although the game is of complete and perfect information, in the unique equilibrium
both candidates and voters are uncertain about where candidates will position, how much they will
4Proving this is more involved than the all pay contest because payo↵s from winning and losing are endogenous.
5See Appendix D for details on calculating the distribution over the final policy outcome.
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spend, and who will win. This unpredictability is a unique feature of the model that arises from the
candidates’ need to remain electorally competitive in the presence of campaign spending.
Divergence The unique equilibrium exhibits divergence – both candidates position away from the
median with probability 1 (FY (0) = 0). The reason is similar to the classic Calvert model, but that
model requires candidates to be uncertain about the median’s preferences. This induces them to
gamble on sometimes winning with a divergent platform. In our model both the median’s preferences
and the e↵ect of spending are known. However, the strategic uncertainty produced by campaign
spending, and the resulting uncertainty in platforms, serves a similar role – platforms away from the
median’s ideal may still win the election, and are therefore sometimes adopted.
Ine ciency The unique equilibrium is ine cient in both spending and policy outcomes. Spending
is ine cient in two senses. First, it is pure waste if assumed to only a↵ect the voters “behaviorally.”
Second, the losing candidate always wastes money trying to win. Equilibrium policy outcomes are
e cient “on average” because they are centered on the median. However, they are also uncertain
ex-ante, harming both candidates and voters due to risk aversion. The root of these ine ciencies is
the nature of campaign spending itself. Spending allows the candidates to bias policy outcomes away
from the median. However, unlike a promised transfer in exchange for a voters’ support, a candidate
must pay for campaign spending before she knows whether it will yield an electoral victory.
Polarization The unique equilibrium exhibits polarization in candidate positions – each candidate
is more likely to take extreme positions closer to her own ideal point than moderate ones closer to the
median (fY (y) > 0 in the support), and places vanishing weight on platforms near the median. The
reason is that candidates are risk averse over policy, so the marginal benefit of “buying” support for
a more extreme platform with spending is largest for platforms near the median.
Voter Extremism In equilibrium candidates spend more, and have higher valence, when taking
extreme platforms (q0Y (y) > 0). This di↵ers with models of exogenous valence, where high-valence
candidates position near the median to have their advantage overwhelm their opponent (see Stone
and Simas (2010) p. 373 for a review). This di↵erence is partially due to the endogeneity of valence
– candidates choose to invest in valence in order to allow positioning away from the median.
More surprising is that candidates spend so much more when taking extreme platforms that the
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median actually evaluates their overall candidacy more favorably. (In the left panel of Figure 1
the candidates’ spending functions are steeper than the median’s indi↵erence curves). The median
thus always votes for the most extreme candidate, and appears to have a preference for extremism!
Consequently, policy outcomes (i.e., the platform of the winning candidate) are even more polarized
than the policy platforms (see the right panel of Figure 1). The reason for this counterintuitive e↵ect
is as follows. To win, candidates trade o↵ spending against ideological concessions. When a candidate
aims to be more competitive (that is, more likely to win), ideological concessions become costlier
because the platform is more likely to actually be implemented. Reversing the statement, a strategy
that makes fewer ideological concessions (i.e. that is more extreme) must also be more likely to win.
Comparative Statics
We last analyze how changes in the model parameters a↵ect various outcomes. Because strategies are
uncertain, this involves analyzing first-order stochastic changes in the distribution of these outcomes.
Recall that a candidate’s spending is qi while her valence is µqi; we analyze the median voter’s
equilibrium welfare both including valence µqi (i.e., interpreting valence literally as a productive
attribute) and excluding it (i.e., interpreting valence “behaviorally” as a bias).
Proposition 2. The six model parameters (in columns) first order stochastically increase (+), decrease
(-), or have no e↵ect on (0), the six equilibrium outcome quantities (in rows).6
x  c ✓ a  v µ
Platform Extremism + + 0 – – +
Spending + + + – –⇤ +
Valence + + + – –⇤ +⇤
Candidate Welfare – – 0 + + –
Voter Welfare (Behavioral) – – 0 + + –
Voter Welfare + + + – – +
Platforms, Spending, and Valence The model predicts a positive association between platform
polarization and spending. The reason is simple: polarization reflects the candidates’ willingness to
spend to gain support for more extreme platforms. To interpret how the model parameters influence
this willingness (and thus both polarization and spending), we divide them into three categories.
6Starred results further require aµ    c v . This states that the marginal cost generating valence – that is, of influencing
voters via spending – is su ciently high, and specifically exceeds the candidates’ (relative) valuation of ideology. When
this condition fails, the indicated parameters do not cause a first-order stochastic change in the indicated outcomes.
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The first is the candidates’ desire for extreme policies, determined by their ideological strength
 v and extremism x. Unsurprisingly, increasing the candidates’ desire for extreme policies magnifies
their willingness to spend to gain support for them, generating both more extreme platforms and
greater spending and valence. The second is the candidates’ ability to translate spending into support
for extreme policies, jointly determined by (i) the candidates’ marginal cost a of spending, (ii) the
e↵ectiveness µ of a dollar of spending on valence, and (iii) the median’s ideological strength  v, which
determines how much spending is needed to “compensate” her for extreme platforms. Increasing
ability through any of these channels also generates more extreme platforms and polarization. The
third is the candidates’ nonideological o ceholding benefits ✓. Higher o ceholding benefits increase
spending and valence, but surprisingly, have no e↵ect on candidate platforms despite the greater
benefit to winning. The reason is that the level of o ceholding benefits does not influence the calculus
of using spending to gain support for more extreme platforms, which is what drives polarization.
Welfare Candidates spend to both pull policy toward their ideal when they win, and to prevent
losing to something ideologically unappealing. On average, however, they do not move outcomes from
the median, and waste money and generate policy uncertainty trying to. They are thus clearly harmed
by spending competition; the degree of platform polarization indicates by how much. That is, they
become worse o↵ when their own desire for extreme policies (higher x or  c), or ability to translate
spending into support (lower a, higher µ, or lower  v), go up. (They are una↵ected by changes in
o ceholding benefits ✓ because they compete all these away through campaign spending.)
Whether the voter benefits from or is harmed by spending competition depends on whether her
“revealed preference” for spending is a behavioral bias or a true reflection of greater welfare, confirming
a conjecture in Serra (2010). With the former assumption the median is harmed; the degree of platform
polarization indicates by how much. With the latter assumption the median benefits, and the level
of spending indicates by how much. That is, she becomes better o↵ when the candidates become
more extreme (higher x), or are better able to translate spending into valence (higher µ), even though
platforms also polarize. Moreover, she would be harmed by constraints or a ban on fundraising and
spending (which also sometimes holds in Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009)).
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Discussion and Conclusion
We conclude with two issues we believe are worthy of greater consideration in light of our results.
First, a growing literature estimates the electoral penalty to extremism by examining the empirical
relationship between candidate positions and citizens’ votes (e.g. Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2018)).
Our model shows that failing to account for strategic positioning can introduce dramatic bias into
such studies – in equilibrium, there will appear to be an electoral reward to extreme positions, because
candidates spend so much more when choosing them so as to overwhelm the true electoral penalty.
Indeed, recent empirical work finds support for the proposition that candidates position strategically
(Iaryczower, Lopez and Meirowitz (2017)), and studies accounting for strategic positioning when
estimating the electoral penalty (e.g. Hall (2015)) yield very di↵erent results from those that do not.
The second issue is the di culty of reforming institutions with the intent of reducing polarization.
Hall (2018) plausibly argues that polarization has risen in part due to a devaluation of public service,
and proposes making o ceholding more valuable to select for less ideologically-motivated candidates.
Our model illustrates the weaknesses of such a simple antidote. Because US elections are costly and
competitive, candidates may simply compete away any new benefits of o ceholding; leaving unchanged
both the value of moderation to extreme candidates, and the value of candidacy to moderate ones.
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Online Appendix
This Appendix has four parts. Appendix A informally derives necessary equilibrium
conditions. Appendix B uses these conditions to derive the unique equilibrium; this subsumes
the characterization in Proposition 1 in the main text. Appendix C proves the comparative
statics results stated in Proposition 2 in the main text. Finally, Appendix D rigorously proves
the necessary equilibrium conditions stated in Appendix A as well as two other propositions
used in Appendix B, and explains two footnotes in the main text.
A Informal Derivation of Necessary Conditions
The game is a multidimensional contest in which a candidate’s “proposal” ( , q) is her
combination of platform and spending, and the “scoring rule” applied to proposals is just
the median voter’s utility µq  v 2, since she decides which candidate to elect. We henceforth
refer to candidate strategies as proposals. We also sometimes refer to the median voter as
the decisionmaker (DM). To facilitate the analysis we reparameterize proposals ( , q) to be
expressed in terms of (s,  ), where s = µq  v 2 is the DM’s utility for a proposal or its score.
The implied spending on a proposal (s,  ) is then q = 1µ (s+  v 
2) which costs ↵ (s+  v 2)
where ↵ = aµ is the cost to the candidate of generating one unit of valence. Note that the
DM’s ideal point with no spending has exactly 0 score, and is the most competitive “free”
proposal to make.
In the reparameterized game, a candidate’s pure strategy (si,  i) is a two-dimensional
element of B ⌘ {(s, y) 2 R2 | s+  2   0}. A mixed strategy  i is a probability measure over
the Borel subsets of B. Let Fi (s) denote the CDF over scores induced by i’s mixed strategy
 i. For technical convenience we restrict attention to strategies generating score CDFs that
can be written as the sum of an absolutely continuous and a discrete distribution.
In this section we informally derive necessary conditions for equilibrium by assuming that
the strategies satisfy the following intuitive and simplifying conditions. First, each candidate
uses an absolutely continuous and atomless score CDF Fi (si) with support over a common
interval of scores [0, s¯]. Second, each candidate positions at a unique platform  Si (si) at each
1
score in the support. Finally, at most one candidate has an atom at score 0 (Fk (0) > 0 for
at most one k 2 {L,R}). In Appendix D we discard these assumptions and rigorously prove
the stated necessary conditions.
Optimal Platforms
With our assumptions, a candidate’s utility from making proposal (si,  i) is
  ↵  si +  v 2i  + F i (si) ·  ✓    c (ix   i)2 + Z
s i>si
   c
 
ix   S i (s i)
 2
d  i. (A.1)
The first term is the up-front cost of spending. The second term is the probability i’s proposal
wins the election times her utility for it, which includes both policy losses   c (ix   i)2
and o ce-holding benefits ✓. The third term is i’s utility should she lose, which requires
integrating over all her opponent’s proposals at potentially di↵erent platforms with higher
scores than si. Taking the derivative with respect to  i and setting equal to 0 yields that i’s
optimal platform  Si (si) at each score must be equal to
 Si (si) = i
✓
F i (si)
⇤↵ + F i (si)
◆
x
where ⇤ =  v c . Thus, optimal platform at a score si becomes more extreme the further are
the candidates from the DM, and more moderate as the cost ↵ of generating a unit of valence
or the DM’s relative ideological strength ⇤ =  v c increases.
The optimal platform may also be written as  Si (si) =  i (y (F i (si))), where  i (y) = iy
and y (P ) = P⇤↵+P x. Doing so clarifies two properties. First, the platform is fully char-
acterized by its distance y (F i (si)) from the DM, since a candidate will only position on
her side of the DM. Second, the optimal distance only depends on the score si through the
probability F i (si) that her opponent  i makes a lower score proposal than si. Since y (P )
is strictly increasing in P , this means that i’s optimal platform is more distant from the DM
the greater is the targetted score si and by implication the more likely she is to win.
Equilibrium Score Conditions
To derive the equilibrium score CDFs (Fi, F i), note that every score si 2 [0, s¯] in the
CDFs’ common support must maximize i0s utility when the optimal platforms  Si (si) are
chosen. Since i is indi↵erent over all scores in [0, s¯], substituting  Si (si) into equation A.1,
2
di↵erentiating with respect to si and setting it equal to zero over [0, s¯] yields a pair of
di↵erential equations that must be jointly satisfied in equilibrium:
f i (s) ·
 
✓ +  c
 
(x+ y (Fi (s)))
2   (x  y (F i (s)))2
  
= ↵ 8i and s 2 [0, s] (A.2)
Equation A.2 has a natural interpretation. The right side is i0s cost of increasing her own
valence, which increases her score. The left side is i0s marginal ideological gain from increas-
ing her score: with “probability” f i (s) she goes from losing to winning the election, which
shifts the outcome from an ideology that is distance y (Fi (s)) from the DM on the opposite
side, to an ideology that is distance y (F i (s)) from the DM on the same side.
Necessary Conditions
Given the above, necessary conditions for SPNE are as follows. (A rigorous proof that
discards the simplifying assumptions is in Appendix D).
Proposition A.1. Necessary conditions for SPNE are as follows:
1. (Ideological Optimality) With probability 1, proposals take the form (si,  i (y (F i (s)))),
where  i (y) = iy, y (P ) =
P
⇤↵+P x, and ⇤ =
 v
 c
.
2. (Score Optimality) Score CDFs (Fi, F i) must satisfy Fk (0) > 0 for at most one
k, supp{Fi} \ [0,1] =supp{F i} \ [0,1] = [0, s¯] where s¯ 2 (0,1], and
f i (s) ·
 
✓ +  c
 
(x+ y (Fi (s)))
2   (x  y (F i (s)))2
  
= ↵ 8i and s 2 [0, s]
B Derivation of Equilibrium Strategies
Using the necessary conditions stated in Proposition A.1 we now explicitly derive the unique
equilibrium. We first use that any pair of equilibrium score CDFs must be identical, i.e.,
Fi (s) = F i (s) = F (s), implying that any equilibrium must be symmetric and unique (proof
in Appendix D).
Proposition B.1. In any SPNE, Fi (s) = F i (s) = F (s), where F (0) = 0 and
f (s) (✓ + 4 cxy (F (s))) = ↵ 8s 2 [0, s]
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Using this we can explicitly derive the inverse of the unique score CDF F (s) satisfying
Proposition B.1, which we denote as sF (P ). Since F (0) = 0, the inverse straightforwardly
satisfies the boundary condition sF (0) = 0. Now using that f (s) =
1
s0F (F (s))
and that
y (P ) = Px⇤↵+P , the di↵erential equation may be rewritten as
s0F (P ) =
1
↵
✓
✓ + 4 cx
Px
⇤↵ + P
◆
8P 2 [0, 1] (B.1)
Finally sF (P ) = sF (P )  sF (0) =
R P
0 sF
⇣
Pˆ
⌘
dPˆ ; the first equality follows from the bound-
ary condition, and the second from the fundamental theorem of calculus.
The preceding characterizes the unique strategies satisfying Proposition A.1 as a common
score CDF F (s) that the candidates mix over, and the platform  i (y (F (s))) at which candi-
date i positions when generating score s (implying a spending level of qS (s) =
s+ v [ i(y(F (s)))]
2
µ ).
However, these strategies may be expressed equivalently but more intuitively as a CDF FY (y)
over the distance of each candidate’s platform from the DM (that is, their extremism), and
a platform  i (y) and level of spending qY (y) when positioning distance y from the DM.
To derive these quantities from the original characterization, we first argue that yF (P )
(the inverse of FY (y)) is exactly equal to y (P ) as defined in Proposition A.1, and hence
FY (y) = ↵⇤
✓
y
x  y
◆
.
First, since there is a positive association between platform extremism and score, FY (y) =
F (sY (y)), where sY (y) denotes the score of a candidate’s platform when positioning distance
y from the DM. This in turn implies that yF (P ) = yS (sF (P )). Second, letting yS (s) denote
the inverse of sY (y), by Proposition A.1 we have yS (s) = y (F (s))! yS (sF (P )) = y (P ).
Next we derive sY (y), which implies spending qY (y) =
1
µ (sY (y) +  vy
2). Recall that
sY (y) is just the inverse of y (F (s)). We then have that sY (y) = sF (FY (y)), recalling
that sF (P ) denotes the inverse of F (s). Now di↵erentiating both sides yields that s0Y (y) =
s0F (FY (y)) fY (y), and it is easily derived that fY (y) =
↵⇤x
(x y)2 . Substituting in then yields
s0Y (y) =
x
(x  y)2⇤ (✓ + 4 cxy) (B.2)
Finally, F (0) = 0 and y (0) = 0 ! y (F (0)) = 0 ! sY (y) = 0 (that is, when positioning
at the DM’s ideal a candidate’s proposal has 0-score). Thus sY (y) = sY (y)   sY (0) =R y
0 s
0
Y (y) dy, where again the first equality comes from the boundary condition and the
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second from the fundamental theorem of calculus.
The following proposition both summarizes the preceding derivations and proves the
derived strategies are su cient as well as necessary for equilibrium (subsuming Proposition
1 in the main text). It is proved in Appendix D.
Proposition B.2. There is a unique SPNE. The equilibrium is symmetric and can be equiv-
alently described as follows.
1. Each candidate chooses the score of her proposal according to a common CDF F (s),
and positions at platform  i (y (F (s))) = i
F (s)
⇤↵+F (s)x when making a proposal with score
s. The inverse sF (P ) of F (s) is equal to
sF (P ) =
Z P
0
1
↵
 
✓ + 4 cx
Pˆx
⇤↵ + Pˆ
!
dPˆ ,
2. Each candidate chooses the distance of her platform from the median voter according
to a common CDF FY (y) = ↵⇤
⇣
y
x y
⌘
. When positioning at distance y, candidate i
selects platform  i (y) = iy and spends qY (y) =
1
µ (sY (y) +  vy
2), where
sY (y) =
Z y
0
x
(x  yˆ)2⇤ (✓ + 4 cxyˆ) dyˆ,
C Comparative Statics
We now prove the comparative statics results in Proposition 2. For the proofs we consider
each quantity of interest separately.
C.1 Probabilistic Outcomes
Because the candidates mix over continuum of platforms and spending levels, most of the
equilibrium outcomes we consider are probabilistic; in particular, the candidates’ platforms,
spending, valence, and the DM’s utility. To analyze comparative statics we thus consider
first-order stochastic changes in the outcome of interest (when such comparisons are possi-
ble). Recall that for two distributions over a univariate outcome z described by CDFs FZ (z)
and FˆZ (z), distribution FZ first-order stochastically dominates distribution FˆZ if and only
if FZ (z)  FˆZ (z) 8z and FZ (z) < FˆZ (z) for some z.
5
For the subsequent proofs we rely on the following straightforward observations. Consider
an absolutely continuous CDF FZ (z;m) describing the distribution over some outcome z,
and which is also a continuously di↵erentiable function of some parameter m. Further
suppose the CDF satisfies FZ (0;m) = 0 8m and FZ (z¯ (m) ;m) = 1 for some z¯ (m) > 0.
Then the CDF has a well-defined inverse zF (P ;m) over P 2 [0, 1] satisfying z (0;m) = 0
and z (1;m) = z¯ (m). In addition, @FZ(z;m)@m < 0 8z 2 (0, z¯ (m)) or @zF (P ;m)@m > 0 8P 2 (0, 1)
equivalently imply that the distribution is first-order stochastically increasing in m (that is,
FZ (z;m0) first-order stochastically dominates FZ (z;m) for m0 > m), while the reverse signs
imply that it is first-order stochastically decreasing in m.
We first consider the distribution over the candidates’ platform extremism.
Proposition C.1. The candidates’ platform extremism is first-order stochastically increasing
in (x, c, µ), decreasing in (a, v), and una↵ected by ✓.
Proof: The CDF over each candidates’ platform extremism FY (y) = ↵⇤
⇣
y
x y
⌘
, which
is transparently first-order stochastically decreasing in ↵ = aµ and ⇤ =
 v
 c
, increasing in x,
and una↵ected by ✓. QED
We next consider comparative statics in the score CDF F (s). This is necessary as an
intermediate step to analyze statics in spending and valence, as well as the DM’s equilibrium
utility if valence is interpreted literally.
Proposition C.2. The score of the candidates’ platforms is first-order stochastically in-
creasing in (x, c, µ, ✓), and decreasing in (a, v).
Proof: It is simpler to work with the inverse sF (P ) =
R P
0
1
↵
⇣
✓ + 4 cx
Pˆ x
⇤↵+Pˆ
⌘
dPˆ for
P 2 (0, 1) and di↵erentiate under the integral sign (since the model parameters do not
enter the limits of integration). Doing so transparently yields that function and hence the
distribution is decreasing in ↵ = aµ and  v and increasing in ✓, x, and  c. QED
We next consider comparative statics in the valence generated by each candidate.
Proposition C.3. A candidate’s valence is first-order stochastically increasing in (x, c, µ, ✓)
and decreasing in a. When aµ    c v () ↵⇤   1, it is also decreasing in  v.
Proof: A candidate with platform (s, y) spends q = 1µ (s+  vy
2) and thus has valence
v = µq = s +  vy2. Now letting FV (v) denote the CDF over a candidates’ valence, it
is straighforward to see that this relationship implies that the inverse of FV (v) is simply
6
vF (P ) = sF (P ) +  v [yF (P )]
2. Results about the e↵ect of ↵, ✓, x, and  c are then immedi-
ately implied by Propositions C.1 and C.2; vF (P ) is strictly increasing in both sF (P ) and
yF (P ), these parameters only influence vF (P ) through sF (P ) and yF (P ), and their impact
on these two functions have (weakly) the same sign.
To evaluate the e↵ect of  v on vF (P ) it is straightforward that
@
@ v
 
 v [yF (P )]
2  < 0
8P 2 (0, 1] is a su cient (but not necessary) condition for vF (P ) to be decreasing in
 v (in conjunction with Proposition C.2) and hence the desired result. Now  v [yF (P )]
2 =
 v
 
P
⇤↵+P x
 2
= x
2 c
↵ ·⇤↵
 
P
⇤↵+P
 2
. Since ⇤↵ is strictly increasing in  v it su ces to show that
@
@(⇤↵)
⇣
⇤↵
 
P
⇤↵+P
 2⌘
< 0 8P 2 (0, 1) which in turn is implied by @@(⇤↵)
⇣
log
⇣
⇤↵
 
P
⇤↵+P
 2⌘⌘
=
  ⇤↵ P⇤↵(⇤↵+P ) < 0 (since log of a strictly positive number is a strictly increasing transformation
with finite derivative), which is transparenty the case 8P 2 (0, 1) when ⇤↵   1. QED
We next consider comparative statics in the spending by each candidate.
Proposition C.4. A candidate’s spending is first-order stochastically increasing in (x, c, ✓)
and decreasing in a. When ↵⇤   1 it is also increasing in µ and decreasing in  v.
Proof: A candidate with platform (s, y) spends q = 1µ (s+  vy
2). Letting FQ (q) denote
the CDF over a candidates’ spending, the preceding relationship implies that the inverse
is qF (P ) =
1
µ
 
sF (P ) +  v [yF (P )]
2 . Now it is clear that x, c, ✓, a, and  v only impact
spending through valence sF (P ) +  v [yF (P )]
2; hence the stated comparative statics are
implied by Proposition C.3.
To evaluate the impact of µ, observe that
qF (P ) =
1
µ
 Z P
0
1
↵
 
✓ + 4 cx
Pˆx
⇤↵ + Pˆ
!
dPˆ +  v [yF (P )]
2
!
=
Z P
0
1
a
 
✓ + 4 cx
Pˆx
⇤↵ + Pˆ
!
dPˆ +
 c
a
⇤↵

P
⇤↵ + P
x
 2
Recalling that ↵ = aµ , the first term is clearly increasing in µ. To see the second term is in-
creasing in µ, observe that since ⇤↵ is decreasing in µ it su ces to show that @@(⇤↵)
⇣
⇤↵
 
P
⇤↵+P
 2⌘
<
0 8P 2 (0, P ) when ↵⇤   1, which is already shown in the proof of Proposition C.3. QED.
We last consider comparative statics in the DM’s utility. We first analyze these statics
when valence is interpreted “literally.”
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Proposition C.5. If valence is interpreted literally, then the median voter’s equilibrium
utility is first-order stochastically increasing in (x, c, µ, ✓), and decreasing in (a, v). It thus
tracks the amount of spending (in the sense of obeying identical comparative statics with
respect to all six individual model parameters) when ⇤↵   1.
Proof: If valence is interpreted literally, the DM’s equilibrium utility is equal to the score
of the candidate she selects. Since she always selects the highest score, the distribution over
her equilibrium utility is described by the CDF over the maximum score [F (s)]2, and thus
obeys identical comparative statics as the score CDF (characterized in Proposition C.2).
Finally, by Proposition C.4 candidate spending also obeys the same comparative statics
when ↵⇤   1. QED
We now analyze these statics when valence is interpreted “behaviorally” and excluded
from the welfare calculation.
Proposition C.6. If valence is interpreted behaviorally, the median voter’s equilibrium util-
ity is first-order stochastically decreasing in (x, c, µ, ✓) and increasing in a. When ↵⇤   1
it is also increasing in  v and thus inversely tracks the extremism of platforms (in the sense
of obeying opposite comparative statics with respect to all six individual model parameters).
Proof: If valence is interpreted behaviorally, then the DM’s utility for a proposal (si, yi)
is   vy2i . Let `i =  vy2i denote the DM’s losses from the proposal (so losses are the negative
of utility), and let FL (`) denote the CDF over losses that the candidates’ platforms o↵er the
DM. Since the DM (incorrectly) chooses the candidate with the most extreme platform due
to spending, she always su↵ers the maximum losses presented to her, and thus the CDF over
her behavioral losses is [FL (`)]
2. By implication, first-order stochastic increases (decreases)
in the losses o↵ered by the candidates’ platforms imply corresponding first-order stochas-
tic increases (decreases) in the DM’s equilibrium losses, and first-order stochastic decreases
(increases) in the DM’s (behavioral) equilibrium utility. Finally, the inverse `F (P ) of a can-
didate’s loss CDF FL (`) is just  v [yF (P )]
2. The parameters (x, c, µ, ✓, a) thus only a↵ect
behavioral losses through the extremism of platforms, and so each of these parameters a↵ect
platform extremism and equilibrium losses in the same way. For the parameter  v, equilib-
rium losses are first order stochastically decreasing for ↵⇤   1 when @@ v
 
 v [yF (P )]
2  < 0,
which is already shown in the proof of Proposition C.3. QED
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C.2 Candidate Utility
The candidates’ equilibrium utility is the only outcome of interest that is not probabilistic,
since mixing implies that the candidates achieve their exact equilibrium utility with any
proposal in the support of their strategy. In particular, candidate i achieves her equilibrium
utility with proposal
⇣
s¯, i
⇣
F (s¯)
⇤↵+F (s¯)
⌘
x
⌘
=
 
sF (1) , i
 
1
⇤↵+1
 
x
 
; that is, a proposal with the
maximum score (which ensures winning the election for sure) alongside her optimal platform
if she expects to win for sure. This yields the following comparative statics in the candidates’
equilibrium utility.
Proposition C.7. The candidates’ equilibrium utility is decreasing in (x, c, µ), increasing
in (a, v), and una↵ected by ✓. It thus inversely tracks the extremism of platforms.
Proof: A candidates’ utility from platform
 
sF (1) , i
 
1
⇤↵+1
 
x
 
and thus her equilibrium
utility is equal to
 ↵
 
sF (1) +  v
✓
x
⇤↵ + 1
◆2!
+
 
✓    c
✓
x 
✓
x
⇤↵ + 1
◆◆2!
= ✓   ↵sF (1)  x2 c ⇤↵
⇤↵ + 1
=  x2 c
 Z 1
0
4Pˆ
⇤↵ + Pˆ
dPˆ +
⇤↵
⇤↵ + 1
!
We now make three straightforward observations. First, candidate utility is clearly decreasing
in x and una↵ected by ✓. Second, the e↵ect of (a, µ, v) is mediated exclusively through ⇤↵,
which only a↵ects the term inside the parentheses. Third, a su cient condition for the utility
to be decreasing in  c is that the term inside the parentheses is increasing in  c.
Finally, taking the derivative of this term inside the parentheses w.r.t. ⇤↵ yields
 
Z 1
0
4Pˆ⇣
⇤↵ + Pˆ
⌘2dPˆ + 1(⇤↵ + 1)2 <  
Z 1
0
4Pˆ
(⇤↵ + 1)2
dPˆ +
1
(⇤↵ + 1)2
=   1
(⇤↵ + 1)2
< 0.
This proves that utility is increasing in ⇤↵ (holding  c fixed) and so increasing in (a, v) and
decreasing in µ. It also proves that the term inside the parentheses is increasing in  c, and
thus utility is decreasing in  c. QED
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D Accessory Proofs
Proof of Proposition A.1
We prove the proposition in a series of lemmas. First, let ⇧¯i (si,  i;   i) denote i’s expected
utility for making proposal (si,  i) if a tie would be broken in her favor. Clearly this is i’s
expected utility from making a proposal at any si where  i has no atom, and i can always
achieve utility arbitrarily close to ⇧¯i (si,  i;   i) by making " higher score proposals. Now
⇧¯i (si,  i;   i) =
 ↵  si +  v 2i  + F i (si) ·  ✓    c (ix   i)2 + Z
s i>si
   c (ix    i)2 d  i.
Taking the derivative with respect to  i yields the first Lemma.
Lemma D.1. At any score si where F i (·) has no atom, the proposal
⇣
si, i
⇣
F i(si)
⇤↵+F i(si)
⌘
x
⌘
is the strictly best score-si proposal, where ⇤ =
 v
 c
is the voter’s relative ideological strength.
Defining the functions  i (y) = iy and y (P ) =
P
⇤↵+P x, the optimal platform may be written
as  i (y (F i (si))).
Proof: Straightforward and omitted. QED
Lemma D.1 states that at almost every score, proposer i’s best combination of plat-
form and spending to generate that score involves a platform exactly at i ·
⇣
F i(si)
⇤↵+F i(si)
⌘
x =
 i (y (F i (si))).
The second lemma establishes that at least one of the proposers is always active, in
the sense of making a proposal with strictly positive score (all positive-score proposals are
positive-quality, but the reverse is not necessarily true). Intuitively, this holds because the
proposers wish to move policy in opposite directions from the DM, and can beat negative-
score proposals for “free” by proposing the DM’s ideal and spending nothing.
Lemma D.2. In equilibrium Fk (0) > 0 for at most one k 2 {L,R}.
Proof: Suppose not, so Fi (0) > 0 8i in some equilibrium. Let U⇤i denote proposer i’s
equilibrium utility, which can be achieved by mixing according to her strategy conditional
on making score-s  0 proposal. Let  ¯0 denote the expected ideological outcome and w¯0i
the probability proposer i wins conditional on both sides making score  0 proposals (these
quantities may depend on the DM’s tie-breaking rule when both make proposals with the
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same score). Now w¯0i  1 for both candidates and ✓   0 (winning o ce is weakly beneficial).
In addition x 1 < 0 < x1 implies   (xi    ¯0)    (xi   0) for at least one k, and both
proposers have mean-variance preferences over ideology. Together these imply that U⇤k 
⇧¯k (0, 0;   k), which in turn is < ⇧¯k (0,  k (y (F k (0))) ;   k) (by Lemma D.1 and F k (0) >
0), so k has a strictly profitable deviation. QED
The third Lemma establishes that in equilibrium there is 0 probability of a tie at any
score. The absence of score ties is an intuitive consequence of exactly opposing ideological
interests and the fact that spending is “all pay” – at least one proposer will find it in her
interests to spend a bit more to break the tie, and make an ideological proposal that is
weakly better than the expected outcome from a tie.
Lemma D.3. In equilibrium there is 0-probability of a tie at any score s.
Proof: The absence of ties at scores s  0 is immediately implied by Lemma D.2.
To rule out ties at scores s > 0, suppose not, so each proposer’s strategy generates an
atom of size psi > 0 at some s > 0. Now let  ¯
s
i denote i’s expected ideology conditional
on a score-s proposal,  ¯s denote the expected ideological outcome conditional on a tie at
score s, and w¯si the probability proposer i wins conditional on a tie at score s. Proposer
i achieves her equilibrium utility U⇤i by mixing according to her strategy conditional on a
score-s proposal. Now using that proposers have mean-variance preferences, that ✓   0, and
that   (xi    ¯s)2    (xi   0)2 for at least one k, it is straightforward to show that U⇤k is 
 ↵  s+  v [ ¯sk]2 +  F k (s)  ps k  ·  ✓    c (xk    ¯sk)2 + ps k  w¯sk✓    c (xk   0)2 
+
Z
s k>sk
   c (kx    k)2 d  k (D.1)
We now argue k has a strictly profitable deviation. If k’s proposal at score s is (s, 0) with
probability 1, then eqn D.1 is  ⇧¯k (s, 0;   k) < ⇧¯k (s,  k (y (F k (s))) ;   k) (by Lemma D.1
and F k (s)   ps k > 0). If k sometimes proposes something else, then it is straightforward
to show that eqn D.1 is <
⇣
1  p kF k(s)
⌘
⇧¯k (s,  ¯sk;   k) +
⇣
p k
F k(s)
⌘
⇧¯k (s, 0;   k), which is k’s
utility if she were to instead propose (s, 0) with probability p kF k(s) , and the expected ideology
 ¯sk of her strategy at score s with the remaining probability (and always win ties). QED
Lemmas D.1 – D.3 jointly imply the “ideological optimality” portion of the Proposition;
each proposer makes proposals of the form (si,  i (y (F i (si)))) with probability 1. Thus,
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proposer i can compute her expected utility from any proposal (si,  i) as if her opponent
only makes proposals of the form (s i,   i (y (Fi (s i)))), and the utility from making any
proposal (si,  i) where  i has no atom (or a tie would be broken in i’s favor) is therefore
⇧¯⇤i (si,  i;F ) =
 ↵  si +  v 2i  +F i (si)· ✓    c (ix   i)2 +Z
si
1
  c (ix    i (y (Fi (s i))))2 dF i. (D.2)
Proposer i’s utility from making the best proposal with score si is ⇧¯⇤i (si,  i (y (F i (s))) ;F ),
which we henceforth denote ⇧¯⇤i (si;F ).
Fourth, we establish that equilibrium score CDFs must satisfy natural properties arising
from the all pay component of the contest, and that these properties yield a pair of di↵erential
equations characterizing any equilibrium score CDFs {Fi, F i}.
Lemma D.4. The support of the equilibrium score CDFs over [0,1] is common, convex,
and includes 0; that is, supp{Fi} \ [0,1] =supp{F i} \ [0,1] = [0, s¯] where s¯ 2 (0,1]. In
addition, for all i and s 2 [0, s¯], {Fi, F i} satisfy the di↵erential equations
f i (s) ·
 
✓ +  c
 
(x+ y (Fi (s)))
2   (x  y (F i (s)))2
  
= ↵
Proof: We first argue sˆ > 0 in support of Fi ! F i (s) < F i (sˆ) 8s < sˆ. Suppose not;
so 9s < sˆ where  i has no atom and F i (s) = F i (sˆ). Then ⇧¯i (sˆ,  i;F )   ⇧¯i (s,  i;F ) =
 ↵i(sˆ   s) < 0, implying i’s best score-s proposal is strictly better than her best score-sˆ
proposal, a contradiction. We now argue this yields the desired properties. First, an sˆ > 0
in i’s support but not  i implies 9   > 0 s.t. F i (s   ) = F i (s). Next, if the common
support were not convex or did not include 0, then there would 9 sˆ > 0 in the common
support s.t. neither proposer has support immediately below, and Fi (s) < Fi (sˆ) 8i, s < sˆ
would imply both proposers have atoms at sˆ, contradicting Lemma D.3. Finally s¯ > 0
follows immediately from Lemma D.2.
To see the di↵erential equations, observe that sˆ > 0 in supp{Fi} implies all s 2 [0, sˆ] are
also in supp{Fi}, implying ⇧¯i (s;F )   U⇤i 8s 2 [0, sˆ] and hence lims!sˆ 
 
⇧¯i (s;F )
   U⇤i .
Equilibrium also requires ⇧¯i (s;F )  U⇤i 8s (otherwise i would havea strictly proftiable
deviation). Hence ⇧¯i (s;F ) = U⇤i 8s 2 [0, s¯]. This further implies the F ’s must absolutely
continuous over (0,1) (given our initial assumptions), and therefore @@s (⇧⇤i (s;F )) = 0 for
almost all s 2 [0, s¯]. Finally this straightforwardly yields the di↵erential equations for score
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optimality, with the boundary conditions implied by Lemma D.4. QED
Proof of Proposition B.1
We prove Fi (s) = F i (s) = F (s) 8s   0 (and hence 8s since then Fi (0) = F i (0) = 0 from
Lemma D.2) by contradiction. First we explicitly write out the coupled system of di↵erential
equations from score optimality, which states that 8s 2 [0, s¯] and 8i:
f i (s) ·
 
✓ + 2 cx
X
j
y (Fj (s)) +  c
 
[y (Fi (s))]
2   [y (F i (s))]2
 !
= ↵ and
fi (s) ·
 
✓ + 2 cx
X
j
y (Fj (s))   c
 
[y (Fi (s))]
2   [y (F i (s))]2
 !
= ↵
It follows immediately that Fi (s) > F i (s) at s   0 ! fi (s) > f i (s). Restated more
intuitively, if Fi (s) F i (s) is strictly positive at some s   0 then it is also strictly increasing,
which further implies that Fi (s)   F i (s) > 0 ! Fi (sˆ)   F i (sˆ)   Fi (s)   F i (s) 8sˆ > s.
Now suppose we have non-symmetric score CDFs; then there 9sˆ 2 [0, s¯) s.t. Fi (sˆ) > F i (s);
then by the preceding lims!s¯ {Fi (s)  F i (s)}   Fi (sˆ) F i (sˆ) > 0, contradicting atomless
common support. QED
Proof of Proposition B.2
The explicit derivation of strategies is fully contained in Appendix D. It remains only to show
that strategies satisfying the necessary conditions in Proposition A.1 and in which the score
CDFs are identical (Fi (s) = F i (s) = F (s) with F (0) = 0) are also su cient for equilib-
rium. First, the di↵erential equations and boundary conditions imply that F (s) is atomless,
so all proposals (si,  i) yield utility ⇧¯⇤i (si,  i;F ) (the utility when ties are broken in i’s fa-
vor), and the strictly best proposal (si,  i (y (F i (s)))) with score si yields utility ⇧¯⇤i (si;F ).
Thus it su ces to show that ⇧¯⇤i (s;F ) = maxsi
 
⇧¯⇤i (si;F )
 8s 2 [0, s¯]. By construction
⇧¯⇤i (s;F ) = Uˆ
⇤
i 8s 2 [0, s¯]. For s > s¯ we have ⇧¯i (s;F )  ⇧¯i (s¯;F ) =   (↵  1) (s  s¯) < 0!
⇧¯i (s;F ) < Uˆ⇤i ). For s < 0 we have ⇧¯
⇤
i (s;F ) = ⇧¯
⇤
i (0;F )! ⇧¯⇤i (s;F ) = Uˆ⇤i . QED.
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Details for Footnote 2
To see why spending qi may equivalently represent the sum of positive campaigning pi by
i to improve her own image and negative campaigning ni to worsen her opponent’s image,
suppose that the candidates may engage in these two distinct strategies. Then the DM’s
utility for electing candidate i is µ (pi   n i)  v kyik2 and her utility for electing candidate
 i is µ (p i   ni)   v ky ik2. The DM thus prefers candidate i to candidate  i i.f.f.
µ (pi + ni)   v kyik2   µ (p i + n i)   v ky ik2
and for the purposes of influencing the DM’s behavior positive and negative campaigning are
equivalent. In our model, the distinction between positive and negative campaigning would
only a↵ect equilibria if they had di↵erent marginal costs. The distinction is also meaningful
when evaluating voter welfare if valence is interpreted literally, since the candidates view the
two strategies equivalently but one increases voter welfare while the other reduces it.
Details for Footnote 5
We explain how the distribution over the final policy outcome depicted in Figure 2 in the main
text is derived. Observe that the distance of the final policy outcome from the DM is desribed
by the CDF [FY (y)]
2 since the DM always chooses candidate with the most distant platform.
Thus the density of the distance of the final policy outcome is 2FY (y) fy (y). Finally, for
each distance y 2 ⇥0, x⇤↵+1⇤ with total density 2FY (y) fy (y) this distance is equally likely to
result from a platform of the left or right candidate; thus platforms   2 ⇥  x⇤↵+1 , x⇤↵+1⇤ have
density FY (| |) fy (| |).
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